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1. Introduction
There is a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) that holds out the promise o f 
giving us a profound insight into Aristotle’s view o f the good. The problem is that the 
passage, A.6: 1096a23-29, has proved remarkably resistant to  satisfactory interpretation, 
defying the efforts o f scholars over the last eight decades. It argues, contra Plato, that the 
good cannot be one thing and, according to Irwin’s translation,1 reads as follows:
Further, good is spoken o f in as many ways as being is spoken of. For it is spoken 
o f in [the category of] what-it-is, as god and mind; in quality, as the virtues; in 
quantity, as the measured amount; in relative, as the useful; in time, as the 
opportune moment; in place, as the [right] situation; and so on. Hence it is clear 
that the good cannot be some common [nature o f good things] that is universal 
and single; for if  it were, it would be spoken o f in only one o f the categories, not in 
them all.
Just what is Aristotle saying here? The main problem seems to  lie in understanding 
what the relationship is between the good, or “good,” and the examples given: Just how 
are they related such that “good” turns out to be spoken o f in as many ways as “being”— 
or, as some would put it, to have as many senses as “being”? Are they things o f which 
“good” is predicated? Or is each itself a good which is predicated o f something else? Or 
are they neither subjects nor predicates o f sentences in which “good” occurs? If  not, what 
is the connection between “good” and the examples?
M985.
22. Interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics A.6:1096a23-29 before Macdonald’s
Each o f these interpretations, and more, have been offered in the literature. Ross,2 
for example, thought that “good” was predicated o f the examples, giving us “God is 
good,” “the virtues are good,” and so on.3 This is very appealing and the “most obvious”4 
way to take them, especially on Ross’s translation, but the problem with it is that it does 
not seem to make “good” multivocal. What is there to prevent “good” from having the 
same sense, even though it is predicated o f items from different categories? As Irwin 
remarks,5 “we might as well say that “amusing” or “strange” is multivocal because both 
substances and qualities can be amusing or strange.”6
Hardie,7 using an interpretation put forward earlier by Joachim,8 offered an 
interpretation that seemed to overcome this problem  He argued that “god is good,” “the 
useM  is good” and so on, “are not simply propositions in which good is a predicate 
asserted o f various subjects; they are definitions. The predicate expresses the essence, or 
part o f the essence, o f the subject; and it is, therefore, inevitably in the same category as 
the subject.”9 “The argument [now] looks very much better,” Ackrill points out. “We 
now have something approaching an identity-statement; and in such a statement the 
predicate-item cannot fail to be in the same category as the subject-item.”10 One 
assumption underlying this interpretation, however, is that “the terms in Aristotle’s 
examples [--and, by implication, any other terms he might have chosen-] stand for 
genuine species and . . .  not merely portmanteau words;” and this, as Ackrill suggests, 
would be difficult to show.11
Since taking “good” to be predicated o f the examples does not seem to help much, 
perhaps we should take the examples to be, not subjects, but predicates—that is, things 
themselves predicated o f other things. This is the approach taken by Kosman.12 “[W]hen 
we say that Socrates is courageous, w e . . .  predicate good o f him. For being courageous 
or being virtuous in general is a good way to be; courage and virtue in general, that is, are 
good qualities. The same analysis applies in each o f the other categories.” “The instances 
that Aristotle gives, then, are not the subjects o f exemplary predicative statements, but
2See his translation o f the argument in  1915 (quoted above).
3 Also Urmson (see 1988,23) and Santas (see 1989, 150)--even Irwin, in his own way (see 1981, 539)-- 
subscribe to this interpretation.
4 Ackrill 1977, 17.
51981, 539.
6Although there is a real problem here, I believe that for Aristotle any term predicated cross-categorically 
does indeed have different senses; I also believe that the way in which such a term would have different 
senses turns out not to help this interpretation, and I argue for this point in “Goods and Predication in 
Aristotle.”
7See Hardie 1980 (first edition, 1968), 56-88.




12See Kosman 1968,171 -74.
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rather the predicates o f such statements. They make clear that the multivocity o f “good” 
is exhibited not only in the fact that many sorts o f things may be said to be good, but more 
in the fact that predicates o f radically different type are in fact disguised means o f 
predicating the good in radically different senses.”13 This makes admirable sense o f the 
passage and puts Aristotle’s examples squarely into the several categories. Is it, however, 
what Aristotle has in mind? Not according to Ackrill: “p ]t does not seem easy to derive 
this point from Aristotle’s text in the way Kösman suggests. It would be surprising if 
Aristotle were illustrating the diversity o f senses o f ‘good’ by allusion to examples that do 
not contain the word; this is not how he or anyone else normally proceeds when exhibiting 
any kind o f ambiguity in a term. The context does not warn us that the rather 
sophisticated notion o f a disguised predication o f good is in play.”14
Ackrill himself proposes that the examples should be taken neither as subjects nor 
as predicates but instead as indicating the criteria on the basis o f which things are called
good,15 and as occurring in sentences o f the following form: “_____ is good because it is
god,” “_____ is good because it is courageous (for example),” and “______is good
because it is useful,” and so o n .16 He elaborates:
There is to be no implication that the subject-terms are in different categories. The 
point is that the ground for predicating “good” in the different cases is radically 
different. If  I say that Callias is good and am asked “how do you mean, ‘good’?” 
or “why do you call him good?,” I answer “he is brave and honest.” But other 
things may be commended as good for other reasons and indeed other sorts o f 
reason—because they are o f the right size or usefiil for some purpose. The criteria 
for commending different things as good are diverse and fall into different 
categories; and this is enough to show that “good” does not stand for some single 
common quality.
This approach seems to combine the virtues o f the past two: “good” is predicated 
o f things, which is natural, yet the examples Aristotle gives are also much like Kosman’s 
disguised predications o f it, and they therefore distribute themselves nicely among the 
several categories. However, it is questionable whether taking the examples to  be the 
criteria on the basis o f which “good” is applied will yield the desired result. As Rawls17 
and others18 have pointed out, the criteria on the basis o f which “good” is applied may 
differ while its meaning remains the same, and the same applies to terms other than 
“good.” MacDonald has a very good example to illustrate this:
“H ot,” for instance, might well have a single sense or meaning despite the fact that 
I appeal to radically diverse criteria in explaining my predicating “hot” o f various 
items. I might explain my calling the vapor hot by pointing out that it is steam (a 
substance); I might explain my calling the molten iron hot by pointing out that it is 
red (a quality); I might explain my calling the liquid hot by pointing out that it is 
boiling (an action); and so on. Thus, if Aristotle’s point in the examples is that
131968, 174.
I41977, 20.
15See Ackrill 1977 (originally published in 1972), 21.
16See Ackrill 1977, 21.
17 See 1971, 405.
18 For example, Hare: see 1952, 108.
4different criteria, which fall into different categories, may be cited to  justify 
predicating “good” o f different things, then the examples he gives do nothing to 
support. . .  the claim that “good” has may senses.19
Since Ackrill’s 1972 article there have been two serious attempts at sorting out 
this passage. One is by Woods,20 who in effect denies that any satisfactory interpretation 
can be given o f this or the corresponding passage in the Eudemian Ethics (EE). The other 
is by MacDonald.21
3. MacDonald’s interpretation
MacDonald, who uses Irwin’s translation o f the NE  passage, concludes as follows: 
When [Aristotle] says in EN i.6 that good is spoken o f in each o f the categories, he 
means that goodness consists in various real properties, and the examples he lists 
in i.6—some o f which are substances, some o f which are qualities, etc.—are some o f
those real p roperties___ Since god and mind are substances, the virtues qualities,
measured amounts quantities, etc.—it follows, given Aristotle’s view o f the 
categories, that the good is not some common nature.22 
I believe that this statement—and Irwin’s acknowledged influence in bringing it about23— 
constitutes a very valuable contribution toward the explication o f this passage and, more 
generally, toward understanding Aristotle’s theory o f the good. The statement is, I 
believe, somewhat inprecise,24 but that is not a major flaw. The problem with 
MacDonald’s interpretation lies not so much with the conclusion he arrives at but rather 
with the specific interpretation o f the NE passage on the basis o f which he arrives at it.
“My strategy,” MacDonald asserts, is “to explain the puzzling passage from i.6 in 
light o f the less opaque discussion in i.7.”25 This is the idea that lies at the heart o f his 
interpretation. In the i.7 passage, Aristotle argues as follows:
But let us return once again to the good we are looking for, and consider 
just what it could be, since it is apparently one thing in one action or craft, and 
another thing in another; for it is one thing in medicine, another in generalship, and 
so on for the rest.
What, then is the good in each o f these cases? Surely it is that for the sake 
o f which the other things are done; and in medicine this is health, in generalship
191989, 158-59.
201992 (first edition, 1982), 65-69. Although Woods’s primary concern is with the corresponding passage 
in  the Eudemian Ethics, both, as he seems to agree (see 66), present essentially the same argument. I
y have argued against this interpretation elsewhere, at length (in “Goods and Predication in Aristotle”).
211989. I offer a somewhat fuller discussion o f these inteipretations—as w ell as my own, positive account 
o f NE 1096a23-29—in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good.”
^1989, 172. A ll references to MacDonald’s work are to this article.
23 See 16Qn30.
24 Since Aristotle, as I shall argue, is not saying that goodness consists in  various “real properties” (that is,
universels) but, more generally, in  various realities or existents.
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victory ,. . .  in another case something else, but in every action and decision it is 
the end, since it is for the sake o f the end that everyone does the other things.26 
According to MacDonald:
In the above passage, [Aristotle] says that the good is different in different 
cases: health is the good in medicine . . . ,  victory in generalship. . . ,  etc. The 
expression “the good in A is x” seems to  be [his] preferred way o f saying that 
action or activity A aims at some end (good) x. He uses the same expression27 in .
. .  Topics [107a5-7]. . . .
The passage from EN i.6 in which the argument from homonymy occurs is 
strikingly similar. Aristotle says that good is spoken o f in the category o f what-it- 
is . . . ,  in quality . . .  ,28 etc. O f course, this passage uses “spoken o f i n . .  .”29 
where the other two passages omit “spoken of,” but this difference appears to  be
unimportant___ Thus, for Aristotle, the expressions “the good in A  is x” and
“good is spoken o f in A, where it is x” seem to  be interchangeable.
The similarity in the mode o f expression in these passages suggests that 
Aristotle is making the same point in each o f them  The claim in EN i.7 is that 
there is an end or good corresponding to activities such as medicine and 
generalship, and these goods are, respectively, health and victory. By analogy, 
then, Aristotle’s claim in EN i.6 appears to be that there is an end or good 
corresponding to each o f the categories, and these goods are god and mind 
corresponding to substance, the virtues corresponding to quality, and so on.30 
At this point MacDonald runs into a problem  How can there be a good or end for 
all substances, for all qualities, and for all the other nonsubstances? As he himself says, 
“whereas the claim in EN i.7 is clear and plausible, its analogue in EN i.6, at least at first 
blush, seems bizarre and perhaps unintelligible.”31 In order to show that the analogue “is 
intelligible and perhaps even plausible,”32 he says that he needs to define more precisely 
what Aristotle means by the expression “the good in (or for an) A is x.”33 In this 
expression, A ranges not only over human actions and activities, as it does in the A.7 
passage, but also over things having a function, and “‘x’ stands for the real nature or 
property in which goodness consists relative to A, i.e., ‘x’ specifies the nature which 
‘good’ signifies in the case o f A(s). Thus, the expression ‘the good in (or for an) A is x’ is 
equivalent to ‘as far as A(s) is (are) concerned, goodness consists in x .’”34 He therefore 
goes on to restate his interpretation o f A.6 in terms o f A.7 accordingly:
On my interpretation, when Aristotle says that the good in medicine is health, he is 
saying that as far as medicine is concerned goodness consists in health. 
Analogously, then, in the EN i.6 passage he is saying that as far as substance is
261097al5-22. Irwin’s translation.
27To be more precise, it o f course is not these expressions that occur in  the passages but, i f  anything, 
substitution instances o f them.
28I have omitted only the Greek for the two italicized phrases.




33For his attempt to do this, see 164-68 and 160-61.
341 68.
6*
concerned goodness consists in (being) god and mind, as far as qualities are
concerned it consists in the virtues, and so on.35
This statement requires some explanation, as MacDonald recognizes, and he 
attempts first to  explain, by reference to  the function o f substances, what it means to say 
that “as far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being) god and mind.” 
Socrates, according to  MacDonald, has a certain function not only qua carpenter or 
harpist or human being but also qua substance; any substance qua substance does, at least 
in a sense.36 That function is to exist independently. “Existing independently can be 
construed as performing a function, analogous to the way in which building and playing 
the harp are functions.”37 M oreover, since the good for any thing having a function is 
performing that function well,38 it is clear what the good for substances qua substances is: 
“On analogy w ith the carpenter and the h arp ist,. . .  the good for substances (qua 
substances) will be to exist independently well, i.e., to  exist as independently as possible. 
The good harpist is the one who plays well or most completely; the good substance will be 
the one the existence o f which is most independent or complete.”39 Although “substances 
exist independently in virtue o f the fact that they can exist independently o f nonsubstance 
particulars. . .  while nonsubstance particulars cannot exist independently o f substances,” 
in this sense no substance, including god and mind, exists more independently than any 
other. “But Aristotle also recognizes at least one other sort o f independent existence. In 
his discussion. . .  o f the first mover Aristotle claims that there is a substance which exists 
independently o f sensible things.. . .  Clearly, not all substances exemplify this sort o f 
independent existence; god an mind, and perhaps only god and mind, do.” Thus, “god and 
mind exist more independently than other substances in virtue o f being independent in 
more respects; they are most truly independent and complete. If  god and mind are the 
most compete substances, then they will be the end or good for substance.”40 This, then, 
is what it means to say that “as far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being) 
god and mind.”
“[Q]ualities, quantities, places, and times,” however, “are not entities which can 
be said to have functions as substances c a n . . .  ,”41 and the good for them therefore 
cannot be explained in terms o f performing a function well or completely. To put it in 
other words, the good for these categories cannot be their paradigm instances, if 
paradigms instances in a category are those members o f it that perform their function well 
or completely, because “there do not seem to be paradigm instances o f qualities, 
quantities, places, and times in the way there are paradigm substances. One time is just as 
much a time as any other, and the same seems to hold for qualities, quantities and so 
on.”42 Nevertheless, there is “an extended sense [in which] we can say that there are 








7actions, activities, and things which do have functions. ”43 For example, although “the 
good quantities [are] the measured (or appropriate) amounts. . . [w]hich quantity 
constitutes the appropriate amount. . .  will depend on whether we are talking about meals 
or missiles and, if  meals, whether meals for a heavyweight wrestler or a ballerina. In all 
cases o f meals the good quantity will be the appropriate amount relative to the person 
whose meal it is.”44 Similarly for the other nonsubstance categories. “The paradigm 
qualities for a thing which has a function are those which enable that thing to perform  its 
function well--the virtues (relative to that function);. . .  the paradigm place for an action, 
an activity, or a thing having a function is the right situation (relative to the circumstances 
or function). Thus, it is actions, activities, and things with functions which have ends or 
goods, and qualities, quantities, relations, times and places are good relative to the goods 
o f actions, activities, and things with functions.”45
This, as I understand it, is MacDonald’s case. It consists o f four main claims:
I. “The good in A is x” and “good is spoken o f in A, where it is x” are 
interchangeable. This claim allows him to interpret the A.6 passage in terms o f
. A.7 and to argue that there is an end for substances qua substances, for 
qualities qua qualities, and so on. This is the key step in his argument.
II. In the expression “the good in (or for an) A is x,” the A’s are human actions 
and activities and things having a function, and the x ’s are real natures or 
properties.
III. The end or good for substances qua substances is to exist as independently as 
possible and, since god and mind are the substances that exist as independently 
and completely as possible, god and mind are the ends or goods for substances 
qua substances.
IV. There is “an extended sense” in which there are paradigm instances o f 
nonsubstances, such that the virtues, the measured amount and the other 
examples given by Aristotle are goods.
These four claims, in turn, allow him to conclude that in the A.6 passage Aristotle is 
saying that goods are, or goodness consists in, various “real natures” or “properties”— 
namely, the paradigm instances given as examples in the passage—and that, since these fall 







84. Are “the good in A is x” and “the good is spoken of in A, where it is x”
interchangeable?
At a literal and superficial level it is clearly false that “the good in A is x” (in A.7) 
and “‘good’ is spoken o f in A, where it is x” (in A.6) are interchangeable, since the A.6 
statement says the good in A is spoken o f in A in addition to saying that it is x. However, 
if we ignore this difference—and MacDonald, perhaps too readily, dismisses this difference 
as ‘^ mimportant”46—and if the A.7 and A.6 passages really are “strikingly similar,” then it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that the expressions are interchangeable. Are they, 
then, so very similar?
A closer reading does not seem to support the view that they are. Although they 
have points in common, the main one being that goods are many, overall they are very 
different—indeed almost opposed to each other.
I translate the A.7 passage as follows:
Again let us return to the good we are seeking: What can it be? For it appears to 
be one thing in one action or art and another in another: it is one thing in the art o f 
medicine and another in the art o f generalship, and likewise in the rest. What, 
then, is the good o f each? Is it not that for the sake o f which47 the other things are 
done? In the art o f medicine this is health, in the art o f generalship victory, in the 
art o f architecture a building, and in other spheres something else; that is, in every 
action and course o f action48 it is the end,49 for all do whatever else they do for the 
sake o f this.
Aristotle’s point here is integrative: although in different actions (πράξεις) and courses o f 
action (προαιρέσεις) the goods are specifically different, what they have in common is that 
in every case the specific good is the end, that for the sake o f which the other things are 
done.
The movement o f thought in the entire paragraph from which this passage is taken 
is integrative. It is a movement toward identifying the good for man, the good toward 
which all our actions ought to  be directed. In the passage just quoted, Aristotle has set 
himself up for answering that question, at least at a certain level. Having just claimed that 
for all actions the good is the end, he goes on to finish the paragraph by concluding:
Therefore, if  there is an end for absolutely all our actions, this would be the good 
achievable by action, and if  [there are] more than one, these would be.50 
O f course, he spends most o f the rest o f A.7 arguing to the conclusion that there is indeed 
an end or good for all our actions, for all distinctively human actions: “activity o f soul
46 See 163-64.
47 /ου χαριν.
48Προαφέσει. Where πράξις and προαίρεσις axe opposed, προαίρεσις may mean “course o f action.” In the 
old Oxford edition, Ross has “pursuit,” which seems accurate and perhaps more elegant. In the revised 
Oxford edition, Urmson-Bames have “choice,” and Irwin has “decision.”
49το τέλος.
5022-24.
9[performed] in accordance with human excellence,”51 and he devotes most o f the rest o f 
the NE  to elaborating upon and explaining what this is supposed to mean.
The point o f the A. 6 passage is o f course more difficult to make out.
Understanding the passage is complicated by Aristotle’s use o f λέγεσθαι, especially its 
occurrence right after he has claimed that good “is spoken o f ’ in as many ways as being is. 
How is one to understand its meaning here? Taking the phrase in which it occurs to mean 
“it is spoken o f in [the category of] what-it-is, as God and mi nd. . . as MacDonald does 
(following Irwin), does not seem very helpful: Just what does this mean?; taking it to mean 
“it is said . . .  in the category o f substance, as god and reason,” as Ackrill does,52 is much 
the same and seems equally puzzling; taking it to mean “it is predicated. . .  in the category 
o f substance, as o f God and reason,” as Ross does in the old Oxford edition,53 is 
inaccurate; and taking it to mean “things are called g o o d . . .  in the category o f substance, 
as God and reason,” as Urmson-Bames do in the recently revised Oxford edition,54 seems 
ill supported by the Greek.55
Perhaps “means,” one o f the standard meanings o f the verb in its active voice, is a 
better translation o f λέγεσθαι here, as well as at its two other occurrences in our 
paragraph.56 If  so, then “X λέγεται διχώς/τριχώς/. . . ” (a very common construction)57 
is literally translated as “X is meant in two ways/three w ays/. . .  ’’--and more naturally 
expressed as “X means two things/three things/. . . , ” the word “thing” here being taken in 
a very broad sense. In this construction λέγεται is modified by an adverb o f manner, but 
it often has this sense even when it is not.58 M oreover, I think that “means” here carries 
the sense o f “signifies”—that is, that λέγεται here has the same meaning as σημαίνει often 
has.59 This is not at all unusual in Aristotle, w ith many passages illustrating this use o f 
λέγεται and σημαίνει. Indeed, many o f the passages which illustrate this use exhiba the 
following pattern: “ ‘X ’ means many things [λέγεται πολλαχώς], for it signifies 
[σημαίνει] a or b or c . . . , ” indicating that a term  may mean several things because it 
signifies several.60 The passage in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) which makes essentially the 





55I offer a fuller discussion o f these alternative translations in  “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the 
Good.”
56I offer a fidler defense o f this translation in  “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good.”
57See, for example. Prior Analytics A .13:32b31-32 and B.21:67b3-5; Metaphysics A.2:1013b24, 
4:1014bl6, 8:1017al4-15, 8:1017a23, 18:1022a24-36, and Z. 1:1028a 10; ¡wdDe Anima A .5:410al3.
58See, for example: Metaphysics Δ: l:1012b34, 3:1013b26, 4:1014b26, 5:1015a20, 6:1015bl6, 7:1017a7, 
and 8:1017al0. Indeed, Aristotle often uses λέγεσθαι with and without an adverb or adverbial phrase 
indiscriminately, with the same meaning; see, for example. Metaphysics A.2:1013b24 and 29,
4:1014bl6 and 18, and 8:1017al4-15 and 17.
59I am therefore offering what MacDonald would call a “multiple-natures interpretation” o f our passage, 
or at least someting close to it (see 160-62).
60This is illustrated in some o f the chapters from Metaphysics Δ; see, for example: 7:1017a7-8 and 22-24. 
See also De Anima A .5:410al3-16, Metaphysics N .2:1089a7-10, and Metaphysics Z .l:1028al0-18.
61 Although it also says more.
62That passage, A.8:1217b25-35, reads:
10
the NE  passage does not use λέγεται in the first clause and σημαίνει in the second, 
instead using λέγεται in both, this seems merely to  confirm that λέγεται should be 
translated by “means” there and that it means “signifies.”63
I therefore propose to translate the A.6 passage as follows:
Further, since “good” means as many things as “being” [έπει ταγαθόν ίσαχώς 
λέγεται τω δντι]—for it means [things] in the “what” [έν τω τί λέγεται] (for 
example,64 god—that is,65 mind) and in quality (the virtues) and in quantity (the 
moderate-[amount]) and in the relative (the useful) and in time ([the] opportune­
time) and in place ([an] abode) and other things such as these—it is clear that it 
cannot be a certain common universal—that is, one thing; for [then] it would not
“Good” means many things, indeed as many as [πολλαχώς λέγεται καί ίσαχώς] “being.” For 
“being” . . .  signifies [σημαίνει] sometimes what-it-is, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, 
sometimes tim e, and, in  addition to these, sometimes [things] in  the [category of] being-acted- 
upon, sometimes [things] in  the [category of] action, and the good is in  each o f these categories: 
in  substance, mind—that is, God; in  quality, the just; in  quantity, the moderate-amount; in  time, 
the opportune-time; and teaching and being-taught in  the sphere o f action. Therefore, just as 
being is not some one thing with regard to the things mentioned, so neither is good, nor is there 
one science either o f being or o f the good.
63 A distinction may be drawn between the signification and the meaning o f a term, where the 
signification o f a term is the existent referred to by it and its meaning is an “affection o f the soul” 
similar to the existent referred to (See De Interpretatione 1: 16a3-8) or a concept or some other mental 
content or its use or the criteria o f its application or that, among other things, which is entered in  a 
dictionary and competent speakers o f that language understand by it—or some other thing different from 
the existent referred to. As I understand them, Irwin (see 1982, especially 242-43,246-48 and 264-66; 
and 1981, especially 539-40 and 543) and MacDonald (see 153-62), following him, would draw some 
such distinction and say that, since for Aristotle the signification o f a term is some real nature, essence 
or property and the meaning o f a term is not, the m eaning and signification o f a term cannot be the 
same thing for Aristotle. Presumably, then, they would not agree that λέγεται should be translated by 
“means” and that it carries the sense o f “signifies” (σημαίνει). (Although they would not agree with 
this, the result is  that the goods referred to in  the NE passage, and elsewhere, become realities, and this 
outcome, I believe, would appeal to both.)
Let m e say at once that with this translation o f λέγεται I do not deny that meaning and 
signification may be different in  Aristotle. “Genus” (γένος), for example, signifies different things for 
him when used to refer to genera in  the different categories, yet it is  not implausible to suppose that it 
has one and the same sense when it is; conversely, “one” (εν) and “being” (ov) signify the same things, 
the constituents o f the categories, yet it would be incautious to assume that they have the same meaning 
for Aristotle. I only maintain that m eaning and signification—and “means” and “signifies”— sometimes, 
even often, come to the same thing for him.
I devote some more attention to Irwin’s views elsewhere (in “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses 
o f the Good”).
64 “For example” seems a more likely rendering o f oiov than “I mean” or “that is.” “Good,” for Aristotle, 
signifies many more things than the ones mentioned here—as indicated, for example, by Topics A. 15: 
107a3-12 (which I quote and discuss a bit below) and Rhetoric A.6: 1362M 0-29 (which I quote and 
discuss in  “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the Good”).
65 An epexegetic καί seems preferable here. If καί had a conjunctive sense, what would this νους, which 
would be other than god, be? Human νους in  general? Any and every particular person’s νους? None 
o f these seem to be particularly persuasive examples o f substances that are goods. Menn ( 1992) also 
takes καί to be epexegetic (see his illum inating discussion at 551 -53); and so do Broadie (1991, 54n21 ) 
and Urmson (1988, 121).
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mean [things] in all the categories [ού γάρ αν έλέγετ έν πάσαις ταις 
κατηγορίας] but in one only.
Although much in this passage calls for explication, its essential point is clear: the good is 
not one thing but many, since “good” means things in all the categories--or, as Aristotle 
might have said, since goods are found in all the categories. This is not very similar to the 
A.7 passage. The point here is not at all integrative, but rather the opposite: it is to show 
that goods are many and irreducibly diverse, not to  point out what is common to diverse 
goods. There seems little warrant, then, for claiming that these two passages are 
“strikingly similar.”66
If this account o f A.7 and A.6 is correct, then, not only is it not true that they are 
“strikingly similar,” it is not the case that “the good in A is x” is present in both o f them.
It is present in A.7, o f course, but not in A.6. Whereas the A.7 expression states what the 
good is and the A.6 expression says what it means (“‘good’ means things in A: for 
example, x”), the implicit expression in A.6 corresponding to the one in A.7 is: “there are 
goods in A: for example, x.” These expressions are not interchangeable, not just because 
the x given is the good in A in the one and merely one example o f a good in A in the 
other, but for other, more radical reasons. In “the good in A is x,” A ranges over actions 
and courses o f action, and the variables for x, although specific things different from one 
another (such as health and victory), are always ends and are identified as such. This is 
not the case for “there are goods in A: for example, x.” Here the A ’s are categories, the 
x’s are goods in those categories, and, contrary to what MacDonald would have us 
believe, there is no indication that the x’s are also ends. Although they may also be ends 
for Aristotle, because they are goods and goods are sometimes things sought, there is no 
mention o f this in the passage--as is not surprising, since to mention that any o f the goods 
have something in common would not only be irrelevant to the point being made but 
would undermine it. In any case, there is no indication that the x’s are the ends o f the A’s 
given, as is the case for the A.7 expression.67
66 This discussion has o f course assumed that “‘good’ is spoken o f in A, where it is x” is in  fact the 
expression that we find in the A.6 passage on Irwin’s translation. That, however, is not actually true.
On his translation the expression would be “‘good’ is spoken o f in A as x ,” and this, whatever its 
precise meaning, is quite different from what MacDonald claims it to be, since it does not also say that 
the good in A is x, only that it is spoken o f as x. The difference between the A.7 and A.6 expressions 
therefore would be even greater than MacDonald’s choice o f words would have us believe.
67 Similar remarks can be made for the corresponding expression in  the Topics passage (A.15: 107a3-12) 
which MacDonald uses to support his claim that the A.7 and A.6 expressions are interchangeable. I 
translate this passage, where Aristotle is trying to help us spot ambiguity, as follows:
Look also at the kinds o f categories signified by the name and see whether they are the 
same in all cases; for if  they are not the same, it is clear that the thing said is homonymous. For 
example, the good in  the case o f food is that which is productive o f pleasure; in  the case o f 
medicine, that which is productive o f health; in  the case o f [the] soul, being o f a certain quality— 
for example, [being] o f sound mind or [being] manly or [being] just; and sim ilarly in  the case o f 
man. Here and there [it is] a time; for example, the opportune time is a good, for the opportune 
time is called [a] good. Often it is a quantity, for example, in  the case o f the moderate amount, 
for also the moderate amount is called [a] good. The good, then, is homonymous.
The corresponding expression here is “the good in  the case o f A is x ,” verbally almost the same as the 
one in A.7. Here, again, the A’s are not simply actions and courses o f action but examples from several 
categories: food, medicine (or the art o f m edicine), the soul, and man. (The A ’s are not specified for the 
opportune time and the moderate amount.) The x ’s are varied. Some are ends: health, the good in the
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5. The dom ains of A and x in “the good in A is x”
MacDonald’s second claim concerns the substitution instances o f A and x in “the 
good in (or for an) A is x”: A ranges over human actions and activities and things having a 
function, x over real natures or properties—where “real natures” or “real properties” seem 
to mean universals (τα καθόλου), and where universale subsume essences (τα τί ην 
είναι)68. Since this claim is made on the assumption that “the good in A is x” occurs in 
both the A.7 and A.6 passages and are interchangeable,69 this is to claim that A and x 
range over the domains indicated in both passages.70
We have already seen that this is not an accurate specification o f the domain for A, 
the domains differing in the two passages. In the A.7 passage, the concrete instances o f 
the expression mention only actions and activities (or “courses o f action”), not things 
having a function. MacDonald admits this71 but goes on to point out that “Aristotle in 
fact believes that more than just human actions [and activities] have ends or goods”72— 
human beings and other things do, too. That is indeed true, but what is to the point here is 
that none o f the substitution instances o f A in the A.7 passage are things having a 
function. In the A.6 passage, on the other hand, A ranges over the categories, and, since
case o f the medical art, is also its a id . However, not all are: that which is productive o f pleasure, the 
good in  the case o f food, is not the end in  the case o f food but rather that food, among other foods, which 
produces the sensation o f pleasure in  us when eaten, so that that kind o f food is the good in  the case o f 
food, not because it is an end sought (although it often is), but because it produces a certain effect in us.
It is surprising neither that the goods here are not all ends nor that they are not identified as such, for 
that, again, is irrelevant to the point o f the passage. The point o f the passage is that a thing said is 
homonymous whenever its name signifies different categories in different cases, and that the good 
illustrates this. It therefore would not have served Aristotle’s point for him  to mention that many goods 
have in  common being ends, or to mention that they have anything at all in  common; as for the A.6 
passage, it would have undermined his point, since their difference, not their sameness, is  important 
here.
68 See 160-61, and 168: “The property o f being good is no single real property, no single Aristotelian 
universal.”
69 And in  the Topics passage, as w ell.
70The purpose served by claim ing that A  also ranges over things having a function seems to be to link the 
meanings o f “the good in  A  is  x” as it occurs in  A.7 and A .6. If we assume that “the good in  A is x” 
occurs in  both A 7  and A .6 and i f  it is  true that A  ranges also over things having a function, then some 
degree o f overlap in  m eaning would be effected between the occurrences o f the expression in  A.7 (which 
talks about human actions and activities but not about things having a function) and A.6 (which talks 
not about human actions and activities as such but, among other things, about substances, which, 
MacDonald w ill argue, are things having a function). However, we may observe that i f  MacDonald’s 
first and central claim were in  fact true, he would not need to argue that A  ranges over things having a 
function as w ell as over human actions and activities. If “the good in  A is x” and “‘good’ is spoken o f in  
A, where it is  x” really ware interchangeable, then the substitution instances o f A in  “the good in  A is x” 
would be identical in  both occurrences o f the expression, in  A.7 and A .6, and, since A.6 is to be read in 
terms o f A .7, they would all be instances o f the sort that have ends—namely, the corresponding 




the categories for Aristotle include everything that exists, it necessarily ranges over human 
actions and activities and things having a function (although none o f its substitution 
instances are specified as such); but it o f course ranges over many other things as well. It 
is therefore inaccurate to specify the domain o f A as human actions and activities and 
things having a function.73
Although MacDonald does not explicitly argue for the claim that x ranges over real 
natures or properties, he does offer an implicit argument, and his discussion o f homonymy 
in Aristotle74 plays a large role in this. For Aristotle, to  paraphrase MacDonald, F is 
homonymous, if  and only if there are at least two things, x and y, that are F and the 
account o f x’s Fness and y’s Fness are different—that is, a different real nature or property 
is signified by the two accounts (Pi); good is homonymous (P2 ); therefore, “there are at 
least two good things, x and y, such that the account o f x ’s goodness and the account o f 
y’s goodness are different; that is, a different real nature or property is signified by the two 
accounts”75 (Ci). What is stressed in this argument is that the two goods are different 
real natures or properties, but it is o f course also true that both are real natures or 
properties o f one sort or another (anything homonymous would have to  be). However, 
MacDonald, presumably on grounds o f the argument just stated, assumes that all goods 
are real natures or properties76 (C2). If  so, then, since the x ’s in “the good in A is x” are 
identified as goods (P3), he can arrive at his final conclusion that the x ’s in “the good in A 
is x” are real natures or properties (C3).
I believe that the first argument here is sound: good is homonymous for Aristotle, 
the account o f homonymy given is accurate, and the conclusion follows. However, it 
clearly does not follow that all goods are real natures or properties (C2). It is not true, 
either. Although Aristotle’s conclusion in the Topics passage considered is that good is 
homonymous (P2), that is not precisely what he says in A.6. In A.6 he says that “good” 
means, or signifies, things in all the categories, and this is a claim broader than the claim 
that good is homonymous. It allows for the accounts o f “good” to signify real natures or 
properties and thus for good to be homonymous, but it also allows for them to signify 
particular substances as well as particular qualities and other particular nonsubstances.77 
Aristotle himself says that “good” signifies Odysseus, Helen, Paris and Achilles,78 and he 
would no doubt have agreed that it also signifies the particular herbs and actions that are 
productive o f health, to mention no others. It also signifies god, as we know, and god, 
because he is not a universal,79 is not a property or a real nature. The more accurate way 
to label Aristotle’s goods, I would argue, is to call them existents (οντα), which is what
73 It is also inaccurate to specify it in  this way for the Topics passage, as I have argued above.
See 160-61. 
’161.
76This is implicit in his discussion o f the ‘M ultiple-natures interpretation o f homonymy” on 160-62, for 
example.
77 By “‘F’ signifies x,” I mean, not “‘F’ is truly predicated o f x ,” but that “F ’ signifies x  in  much the same
way that “Socrates” signifies Socrates or “white [color]” signifies white [color], a universal that m aybe 
truly predicated o f him and other things.
78See Rhetoric A.6: 1363al 6-19. I discuss this passage in  “Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses o f the
Good.”
79 Not being “said o f’ (λέγεται κατά, κατηγορεί κατά) or “in” (υπάρχει, έν) other things in  the relevant 
sense.
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the constituents o f the categories are.80 If  this is correct, then MacDonald’ s third 
argument, although valid, does not persuade us o f its conclusion. It need not be true that 
the x’s in “the good in A is x” are real natures or properties: they might not be, since not 
all goods are real natures or properties. I conclude, therefore, that MacDonald’s claim 
that x ranges over real natures and properties is inaccurate, and that the larger suggestion 
that for Aristotle all goods are real natures or properties is false.
6. The end o r good fo r substances qua substances
I f  MacDonald’s claim that A.6 may be read in terms o f A.7 is not well founded, 
then his claim that substances qua substances have a function does not seem well founded 
either, whether that function is to exist independently or anything else. It is because A.6 
may be read in terms o f A.7 that substances qua substances have ends, and it is because 
they have ends that they have functions--that is the most natural way to explain their 
having ends, on the assumption that they do. If, then, A.6 may not be read in terms o f 
A.7, this entire edifice seems to collapse. Even if it is true that the A’s in “the good in A is 
x” as it occurs in A.6 include things having a function, because they include substances, 
that still would not mean that substances qua substances have a function (or that qualities 
qua qualities have a function, and so on), only that those substances having a function 
have a function. M oreover, even if we were to grant that for Aristotle substances qua 
substances have a function, there seems little reason to  believe that this function would be 
to exist independently. MacDonald offers no direct textual evidence to  support his claim 
that Aristotle held this view—and that is hardly surprising, for the view is absurd on the 
face o f it. For a substance to  exist independently o f nonsubstances and sensible substances 
is merely for its existence not to  be dependent on them, for their nonexistence not to result 
in or involve its nonexistence; it is merely for it to  stand in a certain relationship to them, 
and a negative one at that, and for it to  stand in that relationship is not for it to  do 
anything~it is not for it perform any activity or action, and so it is not for it to possess any 
εργον at all.
O f course, MacDonald recognizes that existing independently is not really the 
function o f substances. According to  him, it is “analogous” to a function and therefore 
can be “construed as” such and is so “in a sense.” However, it is difficult to see how he 
has much o f a case here, unless existing independently really is performing a function.
A.6, according to him, should be interpreted along the lines o f A.7. I f  so, then in A.6 
Aristotle is saying that the good for, or in the case of, substances is god and mind, where 
god and mind are the ends for substances. The idea that substances qua substances have a 
function, and specifically the function o f existing independently, is then introduced to 
account for how substances qua substances can have ends and for why specifically god 
and mind are their ends. For MacDonald to  say, then, that existing independently is not 
really the function o f substances qua substances but merely something analogous to it is 
for him to destroy his case. It is for him to say that this is not, in fact, the function o f
801 have argued for this point at some length in  1988.
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substances qua substances; it is to imply—since this is supposed to be the function o f 
substances qua substances—that they have no function at all; and it is to say that god and 
mind are not, in fact, their ends. Therefore, for MacDonald to say that substances qua 
substances have a function only “in a sense”81 is for him to admit, in effect, that his model 
for explaining the A.6 passage fails when applied to substances.
There is, in fact, nothing in the A.6 passage about substances striving for the 
independent existence o f god or mind, about god or mind being their end or completeness. 
God and mind are given no pre-eminent status there—quite the contrary, they are merely 
examples o f goods in the category o f substance (as are the virtues in the category o f 
quality, and so on for the other categories); nor is that surprising, for the conclusion 
Aristotle is driving at there does not require any pre-eminent status for any o f them—he 
merely needs any old example or two for each category.
7. The paradigm instances of nonsubstances
If MacDonald’s model for explaining the A.6 passage fails for substances, it seems 
to fail even more for nonsubstances. In order for his model to work for, or fit, qualities, 
quantities, and the remaining nonsubstances (now the A’s in “the good in A is x”), the A’s 
must, for every nonsubstance category, be either human actions or activities or things 
having a function, and that is not the case for every nonsubstance category. Precisely 
speaking it is not the case for any o f the nonsubstance categories, since no nonsubstance 
category is accurately identified either as human action or as human activity or as thing 
having a function. Also, for every nonsubstance category, the x’s in every case must be 
the ends, or paradigm instances, o f their respective A’s, and that is not the case either: the 
virtues, for example, are not the ends o f qualities qua qualities or their paradigm instances.
MacDonald o f course recognizes this.82 Only in an “extended sense”83 is it true 
that there are ends for or paradigm instances o f them—that is his third claim. This, 
however, is also for him to admit, in effect, that his model for explaining A.6 fails to 
apply: for every nonsubstance category there must really be ends, or paradigm instances, 
in order for his model to work, and MacDonald admits that there are not.
The basis for his claim that in an extended sense there are paradigm instances o f 
nonsubstances admittedly is sound enough. His basis is that, since “actions, activities, and 
things having a function. . .  have ends or goods,” we can say, and Aristotle would have 
agreed, that “qualities, quantities, relations, times and places are good relative to the 
goods o f actions, activities, and things with functions.”84 The question, however, is 
whether this is the reason why Aristotle considered the nonsubstances given in the A.6
81 We may also ask whether existing independently is even analogous to performing a function. They are 
not analogous by example, as the role o f the heart may be analogous to the role o f a mechanical pump; 






passage to be goods, and it does not seem that it can be. After having argued in our 
passage that the good cannot be one thing because goods fall into all the categories, he 
goes on, a little later in the same chapter, to speculate about how these disparate goods 
might be connected or united: “But what, then, does it [i.e., the good] mean? It certainly 
is not like the things bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods 
belong to one class at least85 by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative to 
one thing? Or [do all goods belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight is in the 
body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)?”86 It is evident from this passage 
that the goods about whose connection to one another he is speculating are already 
considered by him to  be goods, and that he expects his reader to consider them  to be so, 
even before he has arrived at a satisfactory answer to how they might be connected. It 
therefore will not do to say that some o f these, the nonsubstances given, are goods for 
Aristotle by virtue o f that connection or relation; they were goods to begin with, or at 
least Aristotle considered them to be so, and only later began to wonder about their 
connection or unity.
8. Conclusion
It must be said, then, that MacDonald’s attempt at explicating the A.6 passage is 
not successful. Although his main conclusion--that Aristotle’s examples in the A.6 
passage are goods, and that these goods are “real natures” or “properties”--happens to be 
largely true, the interpretation o f the A.6 passage he offers in support o f this conclusion 
will not stand up to scrutiny. There is no warrant for interpreting the A.6 passage in terms 
o f the A.7 discussion, and even if there were, such that we should have to accept his 
model for interpreting the A.6 passage, that model fails on its own terms.
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